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ABSTRACT 
Anthropology combines two quite different enterprises: the ethnographic study of particular 
people in particular places and the theorising about the human species. As such, anthropology 
is part of cognitive science in that it contributes to the unitary theoretical aim of 
understanding and explaining the behaviour of the animal species Homo Sapiens. The paper 
draws on our own research experience to illustrate that cooperation between anthropology 
and the other sub-disciplines of cognitive science is possible and fruitful, but must proceed 
from the recognition of anthropology’s unique epistemology and methodology. 
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Before addressing the question of whether anthropology should be part of cognitive science, 
we want to clarify what we mean by anthropology.  In this paper we use the word to refer to 
what is normally known as social and cultural anthropology. These two related disciplinary 
traditions are characterised by the oddity that they entail two quite different enterprises 
(Sperber, 1985). One is “ethnography” which involves the in-depth study of particular people 
in particular places. The other is “anthropology” which involves theorising about the human 
species. In practice, social and cultural anthropologists, including the authors of this paper, 
have most often done both jobs together. This may seem an odd combination, but we believe 
this awkward amalgam has been one of the subject’s greatest strengths and it is perhaps one 
of the most important contributions that anthropologists can bring to cognitive science. This 
is because anthropologists’ theorisation is always haunted by the presence, at the back of the 
mind, of specific places and situations, while anthropologists’ ethnographic description is 
always haunted, at the back of the mind, by the generalizing aim of theorisation. In what 
follows, when we refer to anthropology we mean the kind of social and cultural anthropology 
which combines ethnography and theory. 
There can be no doubt that anthropology, as we understand it, is part of cognitive science, 
since it shares with it the same theoretical aim: to understand and explain the behaviour of 
members of the animal species Homo Sapiens. Of course, as a discipline that is practiced in 
specific university departments or that adheres to particular intellectual traditions, 
anthropology does appear to have had a troubled relationship with cognitive science. But the 
problem is one of institutional arrangements and historical contingencies, not of theoretical 
incompatibilities. Cooperation should be established around the joint theoretical aim of 
cognitive science, which will ultimately determine who will want to co-operate with whom 
and who will not. Thus, if there are people in university departments labelled “anthropology” 
who, implicitly or explicitly, disregard the evolved history of Homo Sapiens or people in 
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departments labelled, for example, “cognitive psychology”, who, implicitly or explicitly, 
disregard the historical or cultural character of Homo Sapiens and the specifities that this 
creates, then there is no point in other cognitive scientists making the effort of cooperating 
with them. This is because such scientists are not studying humans but creatures from the 
planet Zog. 
Luckily there are plenty of people who are committed to studying Homo Sapiens on planet 
Earth, and therefore there should be no difficulty for many anthropologists to join or re-join a 
band consisting of many other cognitive scientists. What unifies them is that they are all 
engaged in the same theoretical project. This unity is worth stressing. To put it simply: there 
is only one theory. Theory is one because there is only one phenomenon to be addressed: the 
nature of human beings. Theoretical proposals, from wherever they emanate, whether from 
anthropology or psychology or philosophy or wherever else, should thus be evaluated and 
criticised according to a unified set of validity criteria. This is the point of cognitive science: 
to transcend the differences between particular research traditions and to unify them at the 
theoretical level. From this perspective, anthropologists who embrace this theoretical project 
should be no different from any other cognitive scientists. 
However, in practice, things are not so simple. This is because the temporal dynamic of 
academic disciplines and intellectual traditions leads their practitioners to positions that are 
genuinely difficult to reconcile with that of other cognitive scientists. For example, the 
dynamics of early modularist theories led psychologists to so simplify their understanding of 
cognitive processes that the ways they proceeded to examine them became largely irrelevant 
to the understanding of real human beings, that is, human beings who think and act in specific 
social and historical environments. Similarly, the dynamics of anthropological theories have 
produced unlikely descriptions of human beings that entirely discount the processes of their 
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natural minds and bodies; people came to be represented as acting out arbitrary pre-written 
texts. 
These kinds of dead ends have often occurred in the history of science but there have also 
been corrective mechanisms. One of the most important ones is the confrontation that occurs 
when different disciplinary dynamics come together and criticise each other’s sterile 
outcomes. Thus, one of the strengths of cognitive science has been its federal character which 
has often encouraged such confrontations This may be difficult and painful, especially when 
the challenges come from traditions which have very different intellectual histories, but the 
process has also been productive. This is the reason why we want to maintain the place of 
anthropology within cognitive science, and why we would welcome a rebalancing of the 
various disciplinary contributions to the joint project. As noted by Beller, Bender & Medin, 
cognitive psychology has de facto taken over cognitive science. This is a problem because if 
cognitive science is reduced to one of its constitutive disciplines, all the others will inevitably 
appear to be out of sync. Synchrony will not guarantee harmony, but will generate the kind of 
interdisciplinary confrontations that will be beneficial to all. 
Nonetheless, there are real epistemological and methodological differences between 
anthropology and other sub-disciplines of cognitive science, which should not be 
underestimated and should be fully understood before any real cooperation can be envisaged. 
If we compare, for example, anthropology with cognitive psychology, it is quite clear that 
their practitioners set out from opposite starting points. Typically, cognitive psychologists  
begin by reflecting on the accumulated knowledge of the discipline, formulate hypotheses, 
invent research strategies to test these hypotheses in artificially created situations which, 
ultimately, are intended to clarify the phenomenon: that is, the world which exists out there, 
beyond the laboratory. Anthropologists, by contrast, typically reverse this intellectual 
trajectory, and start with the phenomenon: the every day process of life as it unfolds, for 
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example, in a Malagasy village. Then, by means of speculative reflection and the use of 
accumulated theoretical knowledge, they identify the general processes that have contributed 
to the occurrence of the phenomenon. Anthropologists do not create a laboratory for “as if” 
occurrences because it is real occurrences, in all their complexity and uniqueness, which they 
aim to study.   
Both sides are likely to be horrified by each other’s epistemology and methodology. The 
psychologists will complain about the non reproducibility of anthropological data, which 
means that only evocative anecdotes are adduced as evidence. This means, among other 
things, that the normal tests of statistical significance cannot be applied.  And they will 
complain about the lack of transparency in the anthropologists’ speculative and theoretical 
process. On their part, the anthropologists will complain that the psychologists’ experimental 
scenarios can never, even remotely, connect with life as it is. Worse, they will object that, 
having purposefully isolated the phenomenon, in all its static purity, the experimenter then 
mistakes it for the very distantly related phenomenon that occurs in real life. It is arguably 
this heuristic strategy that generates a whole gamut of misleading oppositions, including that 
between process and content, between innate and culturally constructed, or between universal 
and culturally specific. 
Should we then despair of ever reaching a situation where anthropologists and other cognitive 
scientists can respect each other’s work and pull their knowledge together? The answer is 
“no” because, in fact, despite the inevitable difficulties, there are encouraging examples of 
fruitful cooperation. In this respect, we feel that the picture painted by Beller et al. is perhaps 
too pessimistic (notwithstanding the few exceptions they mention).   
It is true that the American tradition that went under the label of “Cognitive Anthropology” 
(Tyler, 1969) seems to have little appeal nowadays. However, there are anthropologists who 
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have carried forward some aspects of this tradition, and have integrated them with new 
findings from cognitive science (e.g., D’Andrade, 1995; Strauss & Quinn, 1997). From the 
other side, there are psychologists who have incorporated anthropological theory and 
ethnography in their work (e.g., Cole, 1996; Rogoff, 2003) and there has been research 
(Hutchins, 1980, 1996) that is hard to pigeonhole as either anthropological or psychological – 
a testimony to some sort of de facto integration. 
Much has been happening in Europe as well. In his teaching and research at the London 
School of Economics, Maurice Bloch has for many years encouraged the integration of 
anthropology into cognitive science. Building on his legacy, Rita Astuti and Charles Stafford 
have been developing a range of initiatives aimed at promoting cross-disciplinary dialogue 
and cooperation. For example, the LSE Anthropology Department has recently hosted a 
series of lectures and seminars by a large number of cognitive scientists, including 
anthropologists, cognitive psychologists, neurologists and linguists. Over the years, the LSE 
group has worked closely with Dan Sperber and his group of colleagues and graduate 
students. Many of them have been crucial in animating the internet based International 
Cognition and Culture Institute, which was set up by the LSE Anthropology Department and 
the Jean Nicod Institute. Indeed, much of the activities in Britain, but especially in France, 
owe much to Sperber’s pioneering work. It is true that Sperber himself, and the people most 
closely associated with him (e.g., Scott Atran, Pascal Boyer, Larry Hirschfeld), may seem to 
have moved away from anthropology, but their work is nonetheless much discussed and 
taught in anthropology departments. Other active hubs of collaborative research have been 
created, first in Belfast and more recently in Oxford, by Harvey Whitehouse, originally 
trained as an anthropologist at the LSE.  
Finally, quite apart from these institutional arrangements, there are many anthropologists who 
regularly engage with developments in cognitive science (e.g., Philippe Descola, Tim Ingold, 
RUNNING HEAD: Anthropologists as cognitive scientists 8 
Webb Keane, Tanya Luhrmann). And, of course, there is the work of the two authors of this 
paper, which we know best and which we discuss in some detail, as our experience highlights 
both the potential and the difficulties of future cooperation. 
Astuti’s story is a textbook illustration of what we said above about the starting point of the 
anthropologist. She started by spending 22 months in a Vezo village on the coast of 
Madagascar (followed by several other extended visits). She learnt the language, she went to 
market, she went fishing, she attended funerals, circumcision, marriage and tomb building 
rituals, she went to diviners, she watched babies being born and die, she learnt to dance and 
to weave mats, she was blessed by the ancestors and had dreams about them, she recorded 
kinship networks and asked millions of why, how, who and what questions. Based on her 
ethnographic knowledge, she wrote a monograph (Astuti, 1995) – the kind of single authored 
book Beller at al. refer to – that focused on the nature of Vezo social categorization and 
kinship system, while also giving a holistic account of Vezo social life. At this point, thanks 
to a set of conversations already started by Bloch, Astuti became aware of a body of research 
in developmental psychology that seemed to be relevant to her ethnographic findings. She 
read Hirschfeld’s work on children’s social categorization (Hirschfeld, 1996) and Carey’s 
work on children’s intuitive biology (Carey, 1985; Solomon, Johnson, Zaitchik & Carey, 
1996) and spent considerable time and effort in matching their terminology, questions and 
claims with the ethnographic reality of her village in Madagascar. The exercise led right to 
the heart of some key anthropological assumptions about kinship and personhood. For this 
reason, holding tight to her ethnographic knowledge of a small group of people in a small 
village in Madagascar, Astuti decided to confront developmental psychology head on.  
As Susan Carey1 remarked a few years later, Astuti approached the task in characteristically 
ethnographic fashion, i.e., by doing long-term fieldwork among developmental psychologists 
(she spent three months at NYU and 12 months at Harvard in Carey’s baby labs), thus 
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learning their language, techniques, evidential standards, ways of  identifying, thinking and 
writing about a problem. To be clear: there have been no convenient short-cuts in this story, 
neither in the original process of gaining ethnographic knowledge of the Vezo, or in the 
process of understanding the modus operandi of another discipline.  
On her part, Carey’s first move was to read some anthropology. She read a paper by Bloch 
(1993) on Malagasy conceptualizations of birth and on the idea that, from a certain cultural 
perspective, it is children who generate their parents, since it is not until parents have children 
that they become fully social persons; she read Astuti’s monograph and sat through several 
lengthy “tutorials” on kinship and anthropological theory. Like Astuti, she had to learn to 
read a different language, to understand different evidential standards and to find theoretical 
relevance in ethnographic data. Her previous personal encounters with anthropology meant 
that she understood very well the challenges inherent in the cooperation and what was needed 
if it were to succeed. Thus, the simple but crucial stipulation Astuti and Carey made from the 
start was that anthropologist and psychologist were prepared to join forces and to spend time 
and effort learning about each other’s trade only if the prize was the generation of data that 
had theoretical import for both of them. In this way, they avoided the very real risk in 
collaborations of this kind where the anthropologist can easily become an ancillary provider 
of exotic data for the comparative interests of another discipline. We shall have more to say 
about this later on. 
Astuti and Carey worked together because they each had something to offer to the other. 
Astuti found Carey’s work on the development of North-American children’s biological 
knowledge theoretically interesting because, unlike other competing proposals, it suggested 
the possibility of radical incommensurability across cultural contexts in adult biological 
knowledge. Carey’s theoretical approach, in other words, could provide an explanation for 
what appeared to be some very different biological principles articulated by her Vezo 
RUNNING HEAD: Anthropologists as cognitive scientists 10 
informants (e.g., that babies resemble people other than their biological parents).  On Carey’s 
side, the starting point was a theory of conceptual change which predicted that, in the realm 
of biological knowledge, cross-cultural incommensurability was a possibility, and the Vezo 
could provide a case study for the interaction between cognitive primitives and cultural 
context. In fact, this joint enterprise has produced results (Astuti, Solomon & Carey, 2004) 
that have been surprising for both disciplines, thus forcing both sides to take stock and move 
forward to a place neither would have reached in isolation.  
Beller et al. mention the challenge of getting anthropological contributions published in 
cognitive science journals (the same would be true if cognitive psychologists tried to publish 
in anthropological journals). As it happens, the Vezo study was published in both 
anthropology and developmental psychology venues. For each audience, the material was 
packaged according to the appropriate publishing, rhetorical and evidential conventions. For 
example, some of Astuti’s ethnographic data was considered redundant by psychology 
editors, while numerical information had to be tamed before being accepted by their 
anthropological counterparts. In an ideal world of a fully integrated and multi-vocal cognitive 
science, this double act would become unnecessary. But until then, it is important that both 
anthropologists and psychologists are willing to look both ways and learn to respect, speak 
and read each other’s language.  
Once again, the challenges should not be underestimated – it is something of a feat that Astuti 
has made enough of an effort to be able to present her work at psychology conferences and in 
psychology departments, while maintaining her intellectual home in anthropology. This has 
been possible because, effectively, she had the time to train twice,2 an observation that raises 
the important and possibly intractable question of the kind of interdisciplinary training that 
we might want to impart to a new generation of cognitive scientists. There are two issues 
here. The first one is institutional and concerns the employability of graduates whose 
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interdisciplinary training is likely to be deemed inadequate for most mono-disciplinary 
positions. The second one is epistemological and concerns the ways we should go about 
studying the cultural nature of human cognition. If we agree that culture is crucial for 
cognitive science (as in Beller et al.’s challenge 4), then we have to accept that only by taking 
culture seriously we can make progress. Anthropologists take their time to experience, 
describe, understand, interpret the many cultural traditions that only Homo Sapiens has been 
capable of creating. They study culture from the inside and resist treating it as an independent 
variable. Thus, we have to accept that some players in the cognitive science band will need to 
train to understand culture ethnographically, in all its complexity and historicity.  
Astuti has proved that a “mainstream” anthropologist can undertake empirical research that 
speaks to both anthropologists and cognitive psychologists (for another example, see Astuti 
& Harris, 2008). But there are other ways in which the integration of anthropology within 
cognitive science can occur. This is at the theoretical level, and for this too a degree of 
conceptual generosity and acquaintance between disciplines is necessary. To illustrate both 
the challenges and the successes, here’s Bloch’s story. 
In an article published in 1991, Bloch attempted the theoretical integration and cross-
fertilisation of neurological, psychological, linguistic and anthropological data and theory.  
But although this paper has been widely cited by anthropologists and other social scientists, it 
is hardly ever referred to by fellow cognitive scientists. There are a number of possible and 
instructive reasons for this.  
First, Bloch’s use of the theoretical expertise and empirical evidence of other disciplines may 
well appear naïve and superficial to the specialist. We should remember, however, that this 
will always be the case when scientists from one discipline attempt to integrate and use the 
findings of another. Because cognitive science is predicated on such co-operation, the 
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practitioners of the constituent disciplines should get used to help each other with suggestions 
and criticisms in order to minimise the inevitable shortcomings of those who attempt to move 
across boundaries. This is a lesson that should be particularly taken to heart by cognitive 
psychologists. Because of their virtual takeover of cognitive science, which we noted above, 
it might be assumed that only their ways of doing things are acceptable. But this is to forget 
just how varied the constituent disciplines are – and should be.  
 Such variety leads us to reason number two. As we have already alluded above, the style of 
presentation and argumentation and the evidential standards of the different sub-disciplines of 
cognitive science are so different that the publications of one are genuinely difficult to read 
by the others. While this is undeniably the case, if the promise of cognitive science is to be 
realized, sustained efforts have to be made. At a minimum, cognitive scientists should be 
prepared to read each other’s work and, as a first step, each constituency should be prepared 
to suspend disbelief, even if informed criticism is to come next.  
But there is a third, much more fundamental reason why the theoretical work of 
anthropologists tends to be overlooked by other cognitive scientists, and this is the 
fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of anthropology – and with this we come full 
circle, back to our initial definition of anthropology. This consists in the belief that all that 
anthropologists do is ethnography and, what is more, that ethnography is simply a matter of 
bringing back raw data in much the same way as shore scavengers bring back bits of wood 
and the odd exotic sea creature. Such a belief leads some cognitive scientists to assume that 
they can simply reverse the epistemological basis of anthropology and use the anthropologist 
as a glorified and, why not, better organized, disciplined and systematic research assistant, 
whose job is to export their experimental tasks to new cross-cultural locations. As we have 
argued elsewhere (Astuti & Bloch, 2010), the idea that we can make progress “for example, 
by setting up permanent psychological and behavioral testing facilities in bus terminals, 
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Fijian villages, rail stations, airports, and anywhere diverse subjects might find themselves 
with extra time” (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010: 82) is a non-starter. Such an 
approach misunderstands what anthropology is and what its distinctive epistemology and 
methodology can contribute to cognitive science. 
But again, we should not be too pessimistic, for we have a more positive and constructive 
story to report.  Two years ago Bloch was invited to a summer school on “Consciousness of 
the self, consciousness of the others” at the Institut d'Etudes Scientifiques of Cargèse, 
Corsica. Papers were given by cognitive scientists such as neurologists, cognitive 
psychologists and analytical philosophers. Bloch learnt much that was new to him but all this 
new information was heard through the ear of someone who had, in the back of his mind, 
knowledge of a huge anthropological literature on related issues and, of equal significance, 
knowledge of the complexity of social life in the Malagasy villages where he has carried out 
ethnographic field work for a very long time. The nature of this experience raised questions 
about theories that had been formulated solely with WEIRD folks in mind (see Henrich, et 
al., 2010). 
 The summer school was a most stimulating experience and the thought processes that it set 
in motion ultimately led Bloch to write an article which, in its final form, was recently 
published in an anthropological journal (Bloch, 2011). The article aims to integrate data and 
theories from different sub-disciplines of cognitive science that address different levels of the 
self, ranging from the sense of ownership and location of one’s body to the so-called 
narrative, meta-narrative and social self. As he was writing the paper, Bloch had the 
opportunity to present his developing ideas at a number of multidisciplinary seminars and to 
get comments and criticisms from other cognitive scientists. This process is thus an 
illustration that the theoretical integration and cross-fertilisation across disciplines as 
apparently distant as anthropology and neurology can occur.  
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Taken together, our stories suggest that there are many ways in which anthropologists can 
contribute to the joint enterprise of cognitive science. So, let’s just get on with it. 
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